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INTRODUCTION 
A significant question lurks in the background of this symposium: What is 
public interest lawyering? It is far beyond the purview of this essay to attempt a 
comprehensive definition of what constitutes public interest legal practice. 
Instead, like any good common law lawyer, I plan to reason by analogy. 
Specifically, I will highlight a few ways in which the work that copyright and 
trademark lawyers do is often analogous to the kind of work done by lawyers who 
are engaged in practices that are fairly uncontroversially accepted as public interest 
lawyering. 
I begin in Part I by examining how copyright and trademark law are each 
animated by fundamental goals of furthering the public interest and noting that, to 
the extent that one views current law as falling short of achieving those goals, that 
provides an opportunity for public interest lawyering in the form of advocating for 
 
* © 2012 R. Anthony Reese, Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. My 
thanks to Christopher Leslie for organizing the symposium and inviting me to participate, and to my 
fellow participants for helpful discussions on the topic.  
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legal reform. Part II then considers the opportunities that practicing copyright and 
trademark lawyers have for engaging in the paradigmatic form of public interest 
lawyering: representing clients who cannot afford legal representation. I offer 
examples of such public interest copyright and trademark lawyering in 
representing both clients who need to defend themselves against claims of 
copyright and trademark infringement and clients who have their own copyright 
or trademark claims that they need to assert. Part III turns to the potential role for 
copyright and trademark law in public interest lawyering directed at economic 
empowerment for disadvantaged individuals and communities. Finally, Part IV 
explains how copyright and trademark law, perhaps more than many other areas 
of business law, are often intertwined with freedom of expression concerns, and 
thus in some instances representing a client in a copyright or trademark case may 
help achieve the same goals as familiar public interest lawyering, which often seeks 
to defend freedom of speech. 
I. THE PUBLIC INTEREST PURPOSES OF TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
In some ways, it seems strange to ask whether copyright law and trademark 
law are relevant to public interest lawyering, given that each body of law has a core 
purpose to advance the public interest in a particular way. 
Some may think of trademark law as merely regulating relationships among 
the producers of goods and services and protecting certain rights of one producer 
against infringement by competitors. Indeed, trademark law certainly offers 
producers who use marks in connection with their products a valuable tool against 
some uses by competitors of identical or similar marks. But the core goal of 
traditional trademark law has long been to prevent ordinary consumers from being 
confused or deceived.1 In a sense, trademark law is a very venerable branch of 
consumer protection law. While trademark infringement suits are brought by one 
trademark user against another, the basic object of traditional trademark 
infringement litigation is really vindicating consumer sovereignty. For example, if a 
consumer chooses to purchase a particular company’s product, then trademark 
law seeks to ensure that she receives that product, and not one from some other 
producer that she has been led to mistakenly believe is actually the product she 
wants to buy. In other words, if the consumer wants to buy BEN & JERRY’S ice 
cream, then she should not inadvertently end up with BEN & JERKY’S products 
instead. Trademark law’s consumer protection rationale seeks to ensure that the 
consumer can relatively easily make her purchasing choices in the marketplace.2 
 
1. See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (“Infringement law 
protects consumers from being misled by the use of infringing marks and also protects producers 
from unfair practices by an ‘imitating competitor.’”). 
2. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“In 
principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, reduce[s] the 
customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, for it quickly and easily assures a 
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And trademark infringement law can help facilitate other consumer 
protection goals as well. For example, if trademark law ensures that the consumer 
actually gets the brand of product that she thinks she is getting when she makes 
her purchase, then the consumer also will be able to pursue the right party—the 
actual producer of her chosen brand—if, for example, the product turns out not 
to be satisfactory. She might pursue her dissatisfaction by complaining to the 
producer, demanding a refund, posting a negative review online, or deciding to 
shift her future purchases to other producers, but in each instance trademark law 
can help ensure that her actions are directed at the party who actually supplied the 
disappointing product. 
Like trademark law, copyright law also has at its core a goal to serve the 
public interest. Many may perceive copyright law as concerned primarily with the 
enrichment of copyright owners, which in many cases may be (or may be 
perceived as) well-off corporations, such as movie studios and record companies. 
But the fundamental purpose of copyright law, as expressed in the constitutional 
provision that empowers Congress to enact copyright statutes, is to promote the 
progress of “Science”—that is, of learning or knowledge.3 Copyright law aims to 
do this by providing incentives for people to create works of authorship and then 
to disseminate those works to the public. This public-regarding purpose can be 
seen in the title of the very first U.S. copyright statute, passed by the first Congress 
in 1790, which begins with the words “An Act for the Encouragement of 
Learning.”4 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear the public interest purpose of 
the private rights that the law grants to copyright owners. In 1932, the Court 
wrote that the “primary object in conferring the [copyright] lie[s] in the general 
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”5 Sixteen years later, the 
Court wrote that “[t]he copyright law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration . . . [R]eward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the 
public of the products of his creative genius.”6 And again in 1975, the Court spoke 
of copyright law’s goal as one of benefitting the public: 
  [Copyright law] reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public 
interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private 
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public 
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. . . . [T]he ultimate aim 
 
potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer as other 
similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.”) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
3. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 n.11.2 (2012).  
4. 1 Stat. 124, 1st Cong. (1790). The first British copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, had a 
nearly identical title. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
5. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (emphasis added). 
6. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (emphasis added). 
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[of copyright law] is . . . to stimulate artistic creativity for the general 
public good.7 
Thus, while copyright law operates by granting potentially valuable rights to 
private parties (such as authors and publishers), the foundational understanding of 
copyright law is that Congress grants those rights because it has concluded that, 
on balance, those grants will lead to greater production and dissemination of 
knowledge and culture, for the benefit of the public at large, than would result if it 
did not grant such rights. 
For both copyright and trademark law, we can, of course, question to what 
extent the current legal regime effectively implements these core public interest 
purposes and to what extent the law on the books and on the ground has strayed 
from them. For example, the cause of action for trademark dilution, recognized in 
the federal statute only in 1996,8 allows an owner of a famous trademark to stop 
another person from using a similar mark even in the absence of any likelihood 
that the use will confuse or deceive any consumers,9 and this body of trademark 
law seems harder to justify on the consumer protection grounds that undergird 
traditional trademark infringement law.10 And many people believe that the scope 
and duration of rights granted to copyright owners by current copyright law go 
beyond what is needed to provide authors and distributors with sufficient 
incentives to create and disseminate works of authorship.11 
Of course, in many areas of law that are understood to promote the public 
interest, one can question how well the existing law on the books, or on the 
ground, actually achieves those public interest goals. And any gap between the 
law’s public interest goals and its actual effects provides the opportunity for 
copyright and trademark lawyers to engage in activity that seems generally 
understood to constitute public interest lawyering: advocacy for legal reform. To 
the extent that the current legal regime does not serve the expressed public 
interest goals of copyright law or trademark law, that means that public interest 
lawyers have work to do advocating to reform existing law so that it better 
achieves the goals of protecting consumers and promoting the diffusion of 
 
7. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
8. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996). 
Approximately twenty-five states had adopted some form of dilution protection between 1947 (when 
Massachusetts adopted the first state antidilution statute) and 1995. H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 
(1995). 
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). See, e.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:69 (4th ed. 2012).  
10. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003) (“Unlike traditional 
infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law 
development, and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.”); 4 MCCARTHY, supra 
note 9, § 24:72 (“Antidilution law has a strong resemblance, not to the law of consumer protection, 
but to the law of trespass on property.”). 
11. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD (2001). 
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knowledge. To the extent that any proposed revision to the current regime would 
not serve the law’s expressed public interest goals, public interest lawyers still have 
work to do objecting to—and seeking to revise and improve—such proposals. 
Such advocacy for legal reform is well recognized as a type of public interest 
lawyering in other areas, and recent years have seen an increase in public interest 
groups doing such work in the fields of copyright and trademark law, including 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public Knowledge, the Center for Democracy 
and Technology, and others. Whether or not one agrees with their positions in any 
particular instance, these organizations are practicing public interest lawyering in 
their advocacy for or against proposals to amend the copyright and trademark 
statutes. 
II. REPRESENTATION OF CLIENTS UNABLE TO AFFORD LEGAL COUNSEL 
Perhaps the archetypal form of public interest lawyering is providing legal 
representation to clients who would otherwise be unable to afford effective legal 
counsel. Trademark and copyright law offer many opportunities for public interest 
lawyers to represent such clients. In this Part, I look at representing both indigent 
clients accused of infringing someone’s copyright or trademark and clients who 
have copyright or trademark infringement claims of their own but cannot afford 
an attorney to assert them. I also note that representing under-resourced nonprofit 
organizations, as some public interest lawyers do, may sometimes involve assisting 
those organizations with trademark matters. 
A. Representing Clients Accused of Trademark or Copyright Infringement 
Indigent clients may find themselves sued for alleged trademark or copyright 
infringement. Such defendants may well have winning arguments as to why their 
conduct does not violate a plaintiff’s trademark or copyright rights and 
meritorious defenses against such infringement claims. 
Authors and artists are themselves sometimes subjected to overreaching 
copyright claims by another copyright owner. For example, James Joyce’s 
grandson told Carol Shloss, a respected literary scholar who was writing a critical 
biography of Joyce’s daughter Lucia, that Shloss could not quote Joyce’s or Lucia’s 
writings in her work, and could not quote information from Lucia’s medical 
records or letters written to her by third parties.12 In fact, Shloss’s quotations from 
the copyrighted writings of James and Lucia Joyce may well have constituted fair 
use (and the copyright statute expressly provides that fair use does not infringe 
copyright),13 the facts contained in medical records are not subject to copyright 
 
12. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Shloss v. 
Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. 06-3718), 2006 WL 3619866. 
13. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
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protection,14 and James Joyce’s estate owned no copyright in letters written by 
other people to Lucia Joyce.15 
As another example, consider photographer Thomas Forsythe, who took a 
series of seventy-eight photographs called “Food Chain Barbie,”16 which the court 
described as follows: 
Forsythe generally depicts one or more nude Barbie dolls juxtaposed with 
vintage kitchen appliances. For example, ‘‘Malted Barbie’’ features a nude 
Barbie placed on a vintage Hamilton Beach malt machine. ‘‘Fondue a la 
Barbie’’ depicts Barbie heads in a fondue pot. ‘‘Barbie Enchiladas’’ 
depicts four Barbie dolls wrapped in tortillas and covered with salsa in a 
casserole dish in a lit oven.17 
While Mattel claimed (among other things) that Forsythe’s photographs 
infringed on the company’s copyright in the Barbie doll, Forsythe believed that his 
work was “obviously ‘fair use’—political and social criticism presented with 
humor and parody,”18 and would therefore not infringe Mattel’s copyrights. 
Somewhat similar situations can arise involving trademarks, when an existing 
mark holder sues (or threatens suit) alleging that a smaller business, or sometimes 
a new market entrant, is infringing its mark. Consider Bo Muller-Moore, who runs 
a small t-shirt printing business in Montpelier, Vermont. For several years, one of 
his most popular t-shirts has featured the hand-stenciled slogan “Eat More Kale,” 













14. Copyright offers no protection to facts (though it can protect an original expression of 
facts). See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 
(1991); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1542 (7th Cir.1990). 
15. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 4.2.1.3 (3d ed. 2012). Lucia Joyce 
(or her estate) would only own the copyright in a letter written and sent to her by another person if 
the letter’s author expressly transferred the copyright to her. 
16. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003). 
17. Id. 
18. Tom Forsythe, Food Chain Barbie and the Fight for Free Speech, ARTSURDIST, http://www.tom 
forsythe.com/the-fight-for-free-speech.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
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This design, however, has earned him repeated trademark trouble with the fast-
food chain Chick-fil-A, which has several trademark registrations for the slogan 
“EAT MOR CHIKIN,”19 which it uses as part of its advertising campaign 
featuring semi-literate Holstein cows trying to save their hides by persuading 
customers to eat chicken instead of beef. In 2006, Chick-fil-A sent Muller-Moore 
a letter alleging trademark infringement and demanding that he stop selling his 
EAT MORE KALE t-shirts, though when the company took no further action, 
he continued to sell the shirts. When Muller-Moore applied in 2011 to register his 
own trademark in the “EAT MORE KALE” slogan for t-shirts and related 
goods,20 Chick-fil-A protested and demanded that he cease using the slogan and 
turn over his domain name, eatmorekale.com. The dispute is ongoing, leaving the 
parties’ factual and legal disagreements unresolved. However, it is not clear that 
Muller-Moore’s use of EAT MORE KALE is likely to cause any consumer 
confusion. If it is not, then his use of the slogan is not infringing, and he would 
not be barred from registering his mark on the grounds that it is confusingly 
similar to Chick-fil-A’s.21 
As these examples illustrate, artists and small entrepreneurs may face 
overreaching claims by copyright or trademark owners of violating the owners’ 
intellectual property rights. The artist or entrepreneur in these instances may well 
have winning arguments for why her conduct is not infringing. Many aspects of 
copyright and trademark law are fact-intensive and case specific, including 
whether a defendant’s trademark is likely to cause confusion with a plaintiff’s 
trademark, whether a defendant’s work of authorship is sufficiently similar to a 
plaintiff’s copyrighted work to infringe,22 and whether a defendant’s copying of a 
plaintiff’s copyrighted work constitutes noninfringing fair use.23 
But the costs of defending against such suits can be substantial, often 
running to hundreds of thousands of dollars.24 Given the expense of litigating 
 
19. See EAT MOR CHIKIN, Registration No. 2,010,233; EAT MOR CHIKIN, Registration 
No. 2,062,809; EAT MOR CHIKIN, Registration No. 2,240,326; EAT MOR CHIKIN, Registration 
No. 2,197,973; EAT MOR CHIKIN, Registration No. 2,538,050; EAT MOR CHIKIN, Registration 
No. 2,538,070. 
20. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,412,053 (filed Aug. 31, 2011). 
21. Even if Muller-Moore’s mark is not confusingly similar to Chick-fil-A’s, he still might not 
be able to register the mark if Chick-fil-A’s mark is famous (and thus entitled to trademark law’s anti-
dilution protections) and his mark would dilute Chick-fil-A’s mark. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1063(a) 
(2006). 
22. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, § 9.3.1 (“[T]he [copyright infringement] plaintiff must show 
that audiences will perceive substantial similarities between the defendant’s work and the plaintiff’s 
protected expression.”). 
23. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
24. A survey of members of the American Intellectual Property Law Association indicated 
that in 2011, the all-inclusive median cost for litigating a trademark or copyright infringement suit 
with less than $1 million at risk was $350,000. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at 35 (2011). 
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these cases, typically in federal court,25 an artist or entrepreneur who is sued for 
copyright or trademark infringement may not have the resources to assert 
potentially successful defenses against the plaintiff’s claims, particularly if she faces 
an opponent with substantially greater resources, such as the James Joyce estate, 
Mattel, or Chick-fil-A. For this reason, the defendant may have little choice but to 
accede to the plaintiff’s demands and stop using parts of the plaintiff’s work or 
stop using the entrepreneur’s allegedly confusing trademark. As a result, free or 
low-cost legal representation may be key to enabling an artist or entrepreneur who 
is sued to vindicate the legality of her activities and continue them. Public interest 
lawyers who will represent poorly resourced defendants in copyright and 
trademark disputes can thus enable an artist or author to create her works, or 
allow a small business to continue to operate under the name its customers know. 
Indeed, the examples given in this section come from cases in which public 
interest groups, law firms acting pro bono, or a combination of the two 
represented the alleged infringers, demonstrating the importance of public interest 
lawyering in determining whether copyright or trademark claims asserted against 
under-resourced defendants are valid.26 While Muller-Moore’s trademark dispute 
with Chick-fil-A is currently ongoing, courts in the copyright examples above 
ultimately determined that Shloss and Forsythe were not infringing copyrights in 
James Joyce’s works or Mattel’s Barbie, and those authors were able to continue 
disseminating their works. 
B. Representing Clients Asserting Trademark and Copyright Infringement Claims 
Another opportunity for public interest lawyering in copyright and 
trademark law comes not from defending clients against claims of infringement, 
but from representing them in asserting their own infringement claims. As noted 
above, copyright and trademark claims can be very expensive to litigate. Even if a 
low-income plaintiff has a strong infringement claim, the available monetary 
damages might not justify pursuing the claim, given the litigation costs. For 
example, a freelance photographer who finds one of her photographs used 
without permission in a national magazine might have relatively small actual 
damages—the license fee that she would have charged the magazine for 
permission to use the photo,27 which might have cost, for example, only $500, 
$1000, or $2000. If the photographer must litigate a copyright infringement claim 
in federal court in order to recover those damages, the cost of the litigation is 
 
25. Copyright claims can only be heard in federal court, and many trademark claims are 
brought there although they can also be brought in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006). 
26. Shloss was represented by the Stanford Law School Cyberlaw Clinic and attorneys from 
Kecker & Van Nest and from Howard Rice. Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1083 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007). Forsythe was represented by attorneys from Howard Rice, acting on behalf of the ACLU 
of Southern California. See Forsythe, supra note 18. Muller-Moore is being represented pro bono. Jess 
Bidgood, Chicken Chain Says Stop, but T-Shirt Maker Balks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2011, at A12.  
27. Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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likely to dwarf the recovery. (Indeed, even the cost of the lawyer’s time needed to 
send a demand letter and settle the claim without litigation, if the magazine were 
willing to do so, might exceed the likely amount of recovery.) As a result, those 
authors and business operators who cannot easily afford legal representation may 
be unlikely to pursue their potentially valid claims against infringers. In such cases, 
those authors and business operators do not receive any compensation for the 
harm they have suffered. To make matters worse, if the low-income rightsholder 
cannot afford to pursue litigation, she will also not receive injunctive relief against 
any harm she continues to suffer. This is likely to be a particular problem in cases 
of trademark infringement, since it may mean that consumers will continue to be 
subjected to ongoing confusion; indeed, injunctive relief was traditionally the 
preferred remedy in trademark infringement cases precisely in order to prevent 
such ongoing confusion.28 
Copyright and trademark law already attempt to address these difficulties for 
poorly resourced rightsholders, but they do so only imperfectly.29 Copyright law 
provides statutory damages as an alternative to actual damages, so that a copyright 
owner may recover in the ordinary case between $750 and $30,000 per work 
infringed.30 But statutory damages are only available if the infringed work was 
registered with the Copyright Office before the infringement began.31 Of course, a 
low-income copyright owner may well be unable to afford to systematically 
register her works as they are produced, and she will thus be unlikely to be able to 
recover statutory damages. Even if statutory damages are available, the amount of 
the damage award within the statutory range is to be set “as the court considers 
just,” leaving a potential plaintiff (and her potential counsel) uncertain as to how 
large an award she might be able to receive if she wins. 
The Copyright Act and the Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute, also 
contain provisions allowing a court to award a prevailing party her attorney’s 
fees,32 which could offer some encouragement for a struggling artist or business 
 
28. See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947) (noting that an 
accounting of an infringer’s profits will be “denied where an injunction will satisfy the equities of the 
case”); Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 1247 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(describing injunction as “the preferred Lanham Act remedy”); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 30:31. 
29. The Copyright Office is currently conducting a study “to assess whether and, if so, how 
the current legal system hinders or prevents copyright owners from pursuing copyright infringement 
claims that have a relatively small economic value (‘small copyright claims’); and recommend potential 
changes in administrative, regulatory, and statutory authority to improve the adjudication of these 
small copyright claims.” Remedies for Small Copyright Claims, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,758 (Oct. 27, 2011); 
see also 77 Fed. Reg. 51,068 (Aug. 23, 2012). 
30. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)–(2) (2006). The statute also provides that if the infringement was 
willful, the maximum amount of statutory damages rises from $30,000 to $150,000, while if the 
infringement was innocent, the minimum amount falls to $200. 
31. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006) (the only caveat to this rule applies in cases where “registration is 
made within three months after the first publication of the work,” even if such registration occurs 
after an infringement action has commenced”). 
32. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006). 
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owner to bring an infringement claim in the hope that, if the claim succeeds, the 
plaintiff will recover not only her damages but also the cost of hiring counsel to 
bring the suit. Such recovery, though, is by no means assured. The Copyright Act 
gives courts the discretion to award an attorney’s fee but does not require them to 
do so,33 and in any event conditions an award of attorney’s fees on registration 
prior to infringement (as it does for statutory damages).34 The Lanham Act allows 
an attorney’s fee award only “in exceptional cases.”35 As a result, a plaintiff who 
expends the resources to bring an infringement suit in the hope of not only 
winning and recovering her actual damages (or a higher amount in statutory 
damages), but also having the infringer ordered to pay her attorney’s fees, is taking 
a substantial risk. Contingent fee arrangements might help address this problem, 
but these do not seem to be common in copyright and trademark litigation. 
All of this means that a financially struggling author who finds her copyright 
infringed may well go uncompensated for the monetary damages that the 
infringement caused her if she cannot get free or reduced-cost legal 
representation. Likewise, a struggling small business owner who finds her 
trademark being infringed but cannot afford a lawyer may end up not being 
compensated for any damages she has suffered and may not be able to enjoin a 
third party’s continuing infringing use of her trademark and the continued harm 
that use causes to her business by confusing consumers. Representing authors and 
business owners who have valid infringement claims but who cannot afford paid 
counsel thus presents another opportunity for a classic type of public interest 
lawyering in the copyright and trademark fields. 
C. Representing Nonprofit Organizations 
One particular type of client that often can ill afford to pay for counsel is the 
nonprofit organization. An entity’s nonprofit status does not in itself indicate that 
the organization cannot afford to pay for legal representation—extremely well-off 
foundations and private universities may be nonprofit organizations but can 
certainly pay lawyers to represent them. Many other nonprofit organizations, 
though, struggle with very limited resources to achieve their organizational goals 
and may well be unable to afford legal representation at market rates. Pro bono 
lawyering has long involved handling issues—including corporate formation and 
tax exemption—for such entities. 
Trademark law also offers opportunities to practice public interest lawyering 
by representing under-resourced nonprofit organizations, as such organizations 
may find themselves on one side or another of a trademark dispute.36 Consider, 
 
33. 17 U.S.C. § 505. 
34. 17 U.S.C. § 412. 
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
36. Nonprofit organizations may face copyright issues as well, but trademark claims seem 
more likely to arise across a wider variety of fields of activity that nonprofit organizations may  
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for example, the Maya Archaeology Initiative (MAI), a nonprofit organization that 
aims to “provide the means to protect and improve northern Guatemala through 











In 2011, cereal maker Kellogg’s asserted that MAI was infringing on the “Toucan 




















engage in. See Trademark Registration for NPOs, NONPROFIT CENTRAL, http://www.startnonprofit 
organization.com/trademark-registration-for-npos (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (“Patents and 
copyrights may not be relevant for most of the nonprofit organizations. Many nonprofit 
organizations instead go for trademark or service mark registration.”). 
37. Our Mission, MAYA ARCHAEOLOGY INITIATIVE, http://mayaarchaeology.org/index.php 
?option=com_content&view=article&id=83&Itemid=203. (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
38. Kellogg in Fight over Toucan Sam Logo, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 23, 2011, at A11. 
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The company threatened to sue MAI if the group did not alter its logo and 
agree to conditions on its future use.39 The parties eventually settled the dispute 
on terms favorable to MAI without litigation,40 but the episode offers an example 
of the kind of trademark claim that a nonprofit organization might have to defend 
against. 
Nonprofit organizations may also need representation to assert trademark 
claims of their own. For example, The Committee for Idaho’s High Desert 
(CIHD), a nonprofit environmental advocacy organization founded in the late 
1970s, unknowingly let its state corporate charter lapse in the mid-1980s.41 In the 
early 1990s, individuals with views antithetical to those of CIHD discovered the 
lapse, formed a new corporation with the same name, and engaged in advocacy of 
positions opposed by CIHD. CIHD successfully sued the individuals and the new 
corporation for trademark infringement, and eventually won an injunction against 
the defendant’s continued use of the name “Committee for Idaho’s High Desert.” 
These examples show that public interest lawyering can involve representing 
nonprofit organizations that cannot afford counsel to assert or defend trademark 
claims—indeed, CIHD was represented in its litigation by a public interest 
group.42 
III. ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT 
Providing legal assistance that helps economically disadvantaged individuals 
and communities improve their economic situation is another example of legal 
work that is commonly regarded as public interest lawyering. Indeed, UC Irvine’s 
own Community Economic Development Clinic is an example of this type of 
public interest lawyering.43 
A. Copyright and Economic Empowerment 
It can be easy to see copyright as a body of law that benefits economic 
superstars—bestselling authors, recording artists who produce megahits, film 
artists who create blockbusters that break previous box office records, etc. Many 
observers fail to see that copyright law is also very important to many other less 
prominent creators, who are usually much less economically successful than the 
 
39. Id. 
40. John Gallagher, Kellogg Toucan Trademark Dispute Resolved, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 16, 
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 23485907. 
41. Comm. for Idaho’s High Desert v. Yost, 92 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1996). 
42. The Committee for Idaho’s High Desert was represented in the suit by the Land and 
Water Fund of the Rockies. Id. at 816. That group has now changed its name to Western Resource 
Advocates and describes itself as a “nonprofit environmental law and policy organization.” About Us, 
W. RESOURCE ADVOCATES, http://www.westernresourceadvocates.org/about (last visited Nov. 14, 
2012). 
43. See, e.g., Iris Yokoi, Legal Clinic Champions Local Small Businesses, UCI LAW (May 11, 2012), 
http://www.law.uci.edu/communications/ced_feature_051112.html. 
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superstars. These include, for example, the photographer who works as a 
freelancer hoping to sell an image to a news outlet or who produces notecards and 
other merchandise bearing her images; the technical writer who uses her skills on a 
contract basis to produce copy for clients; the quilter who produces new designs 
for quilts to sell to customers; the painter who paints canvases during evenings 
and weekends and sells them online; and many others. 
In other words, many authors and artists who are not copyright’s superstars 
often struggle to make a living through their creative work. Copyright law offers 
an essential part of the infrastructure that might allow them to do so. If the author 
finds an audience for her work, then copyright law is designed to help ensure that 
the rewards from that audience’s demand go to the author, and not to other 
parties who simply make copies of the author’s work and sell them for less than 
the author.44 
As a result, a public interest lawyer who helps an under-resourced author 
exploit her copyrights can assist the author in being able to earn a living from her 
work. This might involve, as discussed in the previous Part, litigating against a 
third party who is infringing on the client’s copyright. But it might also involve 
advising a client regarding potential copyright transactions in order to help the 
client make good economic and business decisions regarding her work and 
livelihood. It is not uncommon to hear complaints by artists who feel that they 
have entered into bad bargains with a distributor (publisher, record company, film 
studio, retailer, etc.) and signed away their rights for a mess of pottage. Legal 
representation for a struggling artist will not necessarily change any underlying 
imbalance in bargaining power between an author and a distributor, but it may 
nonetheless help the author to strike a deal that she finds more satisfactory by 
providing her a better understanding of the legal consequences of the proposed 
bargain. And even if an author decides to accept a monetary pittance from a 
distributor in return for signing over her copyrights because she believes that 
other benefits (such as public exposure) make the overall deal worthwhile, at least 
she will have a better chance of striking that deal with her eyes open to the costs 
and benefits involved. 
B. Trademark and Economic Empowerment 
Trademark law, too, can help support economic development since 
trademark rights can be an important tool for entrepreneurs engaged in such 
development. For example, an entrepreneur working in an economically 
disadvantaged community may start a small business that contributes to the 
 
44. Copiers can typically charge lower prices than original authors because they have not 
borne any of the costs of creating a work and therefore do not need to charge a price that attempts to 
recover that investment in creating the work. See generally R. Anthony Reese, Public but Private: 
Copyright’s New Unpublished Public Domain, 85 TEX. L. REV. 585, 653–54 (2007). 
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economic development of that community. The business may become successful 
and acquire goodwill among customers in the community and beyond, and the 
entrepreneur may be able to expand, potentially further enhancing the economic 
opportunities in the community. Trademark law can allow the entrepreneur to 
prevent others from free riding on the goodwill of her small business and from 
undermining the success of the enterprise (and the amount it contributes to the 
community’s economy), but many entrepreneurs may be unable to afford the legal 
representation necessary to secure their trademark rights and prevent others from 
infringing on them. 
Again, as in the copyright context, public interest legal work here can take 
the form of litigation against third parties who infringe on a client’s trademark 
rights, but it can also involve nonlitigation matters as well. Indeed, a substantial 
amount of trademark representation for under-resourced entrepreneurs might 
involve prosecuting an application to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to 
obtain a registration of the client’s trademark.45 While trademark rights can arise 
merely from the entrepreneur’s use of the mark in the course of her business 
operations, federal registration can offer substantial advantages to the owner of 
the mark’s registration, and many entrepreneurs might not be likely to enjoy those 
advantages without legal representation to help them navigate the registration 
process.46 Such representation seems quite similar to legal work that is generally 
regarded as public interest lawyering: the lawyer assists the client in engaging in an 
administrative proceeding before a government agency in order to convince the 
agency to provide some government benefit to the client. Traditionally, this kind 
of public interest representation might involve, for example, obtaining Social 
Security benefits for the client; in this context, it would involve securing a 
trademark registration. 
Thus, in addition to providing legal assistance to clients who would 
otherwise be unable to afford counsel to represent them in litigating copyright and 
trademark matters, public interest lawyering on copyright and trademark matters 
can take the form of legal representation that attempts to assist with the economic 
empowerment of individuals and communities. 
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Representing clients to vindicate their freedom of speech has traditionally 
been regarded as a type of public interest lawyering, carried out by organizations 
such as the ACLU. Copyright and trademark law are intertwined with free 
 
45. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072 (2006) (governing registration of marks on the Principal 
Register). 
46. Such benefits include a nationwide right of priority to use the mark as of the date of the 
application to register the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c). Another benefit is a registration certificate, 
which constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the registrant’s mark and her exclusive right 
to use the mark. Id. § 1057(b). 
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expression issues more substantially than most types of business law.47  
A copyright or trademark owner can go into federal court and get a court order 
(under the provisions of a statute enacted by Congress) that bars a defendant from 
engaging in certain expressive acts. This brief description alone highlights the 
tension between copyright and trademark protection and the First Amendment’s 
provision that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press.”48 
A defendant accused of copyright or trademark infringement may be 
engaged in using the plaintiff’s copyrighted work or trademark in the defendant’s 
own speech. So a judgment that the defendant has infringed, and an injunction 
against the defendant’s continued use of the plaintiff’s work or mark, may mean 
that the defendant will have to stop engaging in her expression, or will have to 
express herself in a different way. The same consequence will follow, even in the 
absence of any court judgment that the defendant’s conduct is infringing, if the 
defendant capitulates to the plaintiff rightsholder’s demands because litigation to 
establish whether the defendant’s expressive activity is or is not infringing would 
be too expensive. 
Some examples can help illustrate the connections between copyright or 
trademark law and free expression. A copyright example comes from the case of 
Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations, Inc.49 In October 2007, Michael 
Savage, host of the right-wing daily radio program The Savage Nation, made 
statements about Islam and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 
during his two-hour program that CAIR considered inflammatory.50 CAIR posted 
on its website a detailed commentary on Savage’s remarks, including a four-
minute-and-thirteen-second audio clip of excerpts from Savage’s program.51 
Savage sued CAIR alleging that the posting of the audio clip infringed on his 
copyright in the program, and CAIR defended against that claim by arguing that 
its posting constituted fair use. The district court ultimately concluded that CAIR’s 
use did constitute fair use as a matter of law and granted CAIR judgment on the 
 
47. On the relationship between copyright and free expression concerns, see, for example, 
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012), Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX (2008), 
Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970), and Melville B. 
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. 
REV. 1180 (1970). On the relationship between trademark and free expression, see, for example, 
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), Int’l Olympic Comm. v. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 
789 F.2d 1319, 1320–26 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), and Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark 
Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737 (2007). 
48. U.S CONST. amend. I. 
49. Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1730 (N.D. Cal. 
2008). 
50. Id. at 1732 
51. Id. See National Radio Host Goes on Anti-Muslim Tirade, COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC REL. 
(Nov. 1, 2007, 11:40 AM), http://www.cair.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?ArticleID=23608. 
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pleadings as to Savage’s copyright infringement claim, so CAIR can continue to 
allow visitors to its website to listen to the recording of Savage’s remarks in 
conjunction with its commentary on them.52 Although the court decided in 
CAIR’s favor purely on copyright grounds, it noted in its discussion of Savage’s 
other claim against CAIR (a civil RICO claim) that Savage’s claimed injury “is 
entirely founded upon defendants’ speech-related activities,”53 and that the First 
Amendment would place significant hurdles in the way of Savage’s claim.54 Thus, 
CAIR was engaged in classic free speech activity, but faced the possibility that 
accusations of copyright infringement might force it to abandon or substantially 
curtail that speech.55 
Trademark claims can also implicate free expression concerns. One example 
involves claims by MasterCard against Ralph Nader, alleging that a television 
advertisement that Nader ran as part of his 2000 presidential campaign infringed 
on MasterCard’s trademarks in what it called its “Priceless” advertisements, which 
the court described: 
These advertisements feature the names and images of several goods and 
services purchased by individuals which, with voice overs and visual 
displays, convey to the viewer the price of each of these items. At the end 
of each of the Priceless Advertisements a phrase identifying some 
priceless intangible that cannot be purchased (such as “a day where all 
you have to do is breathe”) is followed by the words or voice over: 
“Priceless. There are some things money can’t buy, for everything else 
there’s MasterCard.”56 
MasterCard alleged that the Nader campaign infringed on its trademarks57 by 
running a pro-Nader commercial that the court described as follows: 
That political ad included a sequential display of a series of items showing 
the price of each (“grilled tenderloin for fund-raiser; $1,000 a plate;” 
“campaign ads filled with half-truths: $10 million;” “promises to special 
interest groups: over $100 billion”). The advertisement ends with a 
phrase identifying a priceless intangible that cannot be purchased 
 
52. Savage, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1738. 
53. Id. at 1740. 
54. Id. at 1739. 
55. For another example, see Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203–05 
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (concluding that an electronic voting machine company asserted an invalid copyright 
infringement claim in attempt to suppress publication of employee e-mails acknowledging problems 
associated with company’s machines). 
56. MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1047–48 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004). 
57. MasterCard had registered as trademarks for credit and debit card services the word 
“PRICELESS” and the phrase “THERE ARE SOME THINGS MONEY CAN’T BUY. FOR 
EVERYTHING ELSE THERE’S MASTERCARD.” Id. at 1048. 
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(“finding out the truth: priceless. There are some things that money can’t 
buy”).58 
MasterCard demanded that Nader cease running the advertisement and 
when Nader did not do so, MasterCard filed suit.59 Although the court denied 
MasterCard a preliminary injunction during the 2000 campaign, it was not until 
nearly four years after MasterCard’s suit was filed that the court granted the Nader 
campaign summary judgment on all of MasterCard’s claims. A presidential 
candidate’s advertisement communicating to voters the way in which the 
candidate believes he is different from the other candidates in the race seems to be 
a quintessential instance of the type of free expression that implicates core First 
Amendment concerns. But claims of trademark infringement threatened to silence 
that speech, though they were not ultimately successful in doing so.60 
Here again, a defendant who is sued (or threatened with suit) for copyright 
or trademark infringement may not have the resources to defend herself against 
such a claim. But while the claims against such a defendant may be grounded in 
copyright or trademark law, the claims have implications for freedom of speech as 
well. If the defendant cannot afford to mount a defense, then she may simply 
accede to the plaintiff’s demands and cease her allegedly infringing speech, or alter 
it substantially in order to satisfy the plaintiff that it no longer infringes, even if 
she may have meritorious arguments for why her speech is not infringing. If she 
cannot afford to assert (or be prepared to assert) those claims in court and instead 
capitulates to the plaintiff’s demands and abandons her expression, abandoning 
her speech causes a loss to free expression values and to the people who might 
have received her expressive message. If the defendant has meritorious arguments 
for why her speech is not infringing, then that loss to free expression values does 
not come with any corresponding public gain of any benefit of promoting the 
progress of learning (in the case of speech alleged to infringe on a copyright) or of 
reducing consumer confusion or deception (in the case of speech alleged to 
infringe on a trademark), because the defendant’s use is not infringing and is not 
within the scope of the exclusive rights granted to the plaintiff in order to achieve 
the goals of copyright or trademark law. Instead, the law could allow the 
defendant to continue to speak in the same way that she had been speaking—thus 
vindicating our goal of protecting free expression—and could simultaneously 
fulfill the goals of the copyright and trademark laws. 
 
58. Id. 
59. The suit alleged federal and state trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair 
competition claims, as well as copyright claims. Id. at 1047. 
60. Not all political advertisements that use a third party’s copyrighted work or have 
similarities to a third-party’s trademark will constitute noninfringing use. For example, in Henley v. 
DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2010), the court concluded that online videos posted 
by Chuck DeVore’s U.S. Senate campaign that featured altered versions of Don Henley’s copyrighted 
songs “The Boys of Summer” and “All She Wants to Do Is Dance” did not qualify as noninfringing 
fair use, and therefore infringed on Henley’s copyrights.  
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Without counsel to represent defendants in such cases—either by actually 
taking the defendant’s arguments to court or by using them to resist demands 
made by a rightsholder in cease-and-desist letters that threaten litigation—society 
will simply lose the defendants’ speech and suffer a free-expression harm without 
any counterbalancing copyright or trademark gain. Representing defendants who 
could not otherwise afford to defend against infringement claims that might 
improperly interfere with the defendants’ free expression thus offers an important 
opportunity for public interest lawyering in the copyright and trademark fields. 
Furthermore, because courts have generally resisted subjecting copyright and 
trademark claims to formal First Amendment scrutiny,61 public interest lawyers 
who work in this area will often need to argue these cases within the framework of 
copyright or trademark law. Courts are far more likely, for example, to resolve 
these cases in favor of a defendant on the ground that the defendant’s use 
qualifies under copyright law as fair use, and therefore does not infringe on the 
plaintiff’s copyright, than to determine that although the defendant’s use 
constitutes copyright infringement under the current Copyright Act as applied, 
that application of the Copyright Act is outside of Congress’s power because it 
violates the First Amendment.62 That is, after all, how the court resolved Savage’s 
copyright infringement claim against CAIR. Similarly, courts generally resolve 
trademark infringement claims based on the standard “likelihood of confusion” 
analysis, even when the defendant’s alleged use of the mark might seem to 
constitute speech at the core of First Amendment protection, as the court did with 
MasterCard’s claims against Nader.63 
In many of these situations, defendants who face charges of infringement 
will be unable to afford an attorney to represent them in expensive and potentially 
protracted litigation. Indeed, the defendants in the examples given in this part 
were represented by public interest organizations or private attorneys acting pro 
bono.64 Here again, then, copyright and trademark cases present the opportunity 
 
61. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193–94 (2003); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 
876 (2012); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002). 
62. See, e.g., Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1730, 
1737 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (resolving a copyright claim for the defendant on fair use, not First 
Amendment, grounds); MasterCard, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1050–51 (resolving a trademark claim for the 
defendant on grounds that the defendant’s use was not likely to confuse consumers, not on First 
Amendment grounds).  
63. MasterCard, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1050–51; see also Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute 
Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 263 (2007) (adapting the standard likelihood of confusion analysis 
for the situation where the defendant’s use qualifies as parody). But see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. 
Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 1994) (analyzing whether the defendant’s use should be 
allowed because of free speech interests after having concluded that use was likely to cause consumer 
confusion under the standard analysis). 
64. In Savage, CAIR was represented by the nonprofit Electronic Frontier Foundation as well 
as an attorney from Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, 2008 WL 2951281. Fish & Richardson represented 
the Nader campaign pro bono. See Sheri Qualters, Charitable Protections: More Local Law Firms Offer IP 
Expertise on a Pro Bono Basis, BOSTON BUS. J., Sept. 24, 2004, at 44, 51. 
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for public interest lawyering quite similar to familiar public interest lawyering—
representing clients seeking to vindicate their rights to freedom of expression. 
CONCLUSION 
Copyright and trademark are bodies of substantive law that provide 
opportunities for lawyers to practice law in ways that seem fairly commonly 
understood as public interest lawyering. While some may see copyright and 
trademark disputes as generally involving battles between well-to-do parties, such 
disputes not only can, but often do, involve at least one party that may not be able 
to afford legal representation. This means that public interest lawyers have 
opportunities to represent indigent clients who likely would not otherwise have 
their interests represented in the legal system. In addition, such representation can 
sometimes serve to help foster economic development. And, because copyright 
and trademark law are often closely intertwined with issues of freedom of speech, 
representing clients in these matters often protects values of free expression, 
allowing the client to continue to speak and the public to benefit from that speech. 
All of these types of copyright and trademark practice can fit well within 
conventional understandings of what constitutes public interest lawyering. 
  
